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MR. JUSTICE HARLAN
The appointment of John Marshall Harlan to the Su-
preme Court has been received with widespread approval.
The New York Times, for instance, has said that he is "an
outstanding selection for the post."' The Court lost a
valuable member when Mr. Justice Jackson died, and it
is indeed fortunate that his successor is a jurist of Justice
Harlan's capacity.
The newest Justice comes from a family devoted to pub-
lic service in the law. His great-grandfather was an attor-
ney, and his grandfather, as is well known, was also Mr.
Justice John Marshall Harlan. The first Justice Harlan
sat on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years, from 1877
to 1911, one of the longest periods of service on the Court.
The present Justice's father was also an attorney, and was
a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
John Marshall Harlan was born in Chicago on May 20,
1899. At fifty-five, he is the second youngest member of
the present Court. Only Justice Clark is younger, by
barely a few months.
After elementary schooling here and in Canada, Har-
1 Editorial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1955, p. 22, col. 2.
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lan studied at Princeton University (A.B., 1920). He was
a Rhodes Scholar for three years at Balliol College, Ox-
ford University (B.A., M.A., 1923), where he commenced
the study of law. Upon returning to this country, he com-
pleted his law work at New York Law School (LL.B.
1924), and was admitted to practice in New York in 1924.
For the next thirty years, Harlan was an active and
a busy practicing lawyer. His field was litigation, almost
exclusively, but of all types and in all its aspects. He be-
gan as an apprentice in the office of Root, Clark, Buckner
& Ballantine, and became a member of the firm in 1932.
He soon was one of New York's leading trial and appellate
lawyers. His last case was the immense anti-trust pro-
ceeding against the du Ponts, General Motors and United
States Rubber Company, in which he represented certain
defendants.2
The thread of roughly the first half of Harlan's career
is to be found in a close association with Emory R. Buck-
ner. Mr. Buckner was not only an outstanding trial law-
yer and leader of the Bar, but a remarkable person as
well, with a deep interest in the training of young lawyers
and in furthering their careers.
As Justice Harlan has put it, he started out by carrying
Mr. Buckner's bag to court. In 1925, Buckner was ap-
pointed United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York, and Harlan became an Assistant United
States Attorney. Here he tried the usual run of federal
criminal cases, and also assisted Buckner in a number of
other cases. Noteworthy among the latter was United
States v. Miller, a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud
the United States. The defendants were Harry M. Daugh-
erty, the former Attorney General of the United States,
and Thomas W. Miller, former Alien Property Custodian,
the case arising out of irregularities in the office of the
2 See p. 355, infra.
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custodian.'
Buckner and Harlan returned to their firm in 1927, but
Buckner was soon called upon for further public service.
He became counsel in an investigation of sewer graft scan-
dals in Queens County, New York, and later he was ap-
pointed special prosecutor. Buckner made Harlan his
principal assistant.
As a result of the investigation, Maurice E. Connolly,
the Borough President of Queens, and others were con-
victed of conspiracy to defraud.' The case was note-
worthy in several respects. No graft was traced directly
to Connolly, but the prosecution did show that he had
used substantial amounts of cash in excess of his salary
and apart from any bank account. He attempted no ex-
planation of the source of any of this cash. It was held
that this evidence, plus other circumstantial evidence ty-
ing him to the conspiracy, could be found by the jury to
show improper motive on his part. This was one of the
first successful prosecutions upon this type of circum-
stantial evidence.5 The prosecution also broke new ground
in its methods of proof of complicated financial data., par-
ticularly in the use of simplified charts which were avail-
able for the study of the jury.
In the 1930's, Harlan became his firm's second trial
man, behind Buckner. The latter, however, had several
periods of ill health and the burden of the firm's litigation
fell increasingly on Harlan's shoulders. An early illustra-
tion, of great significance in Harlan's career, was the Wen-
del estate litigation.
3 The jury disagreed as to Daugherty and the indictment against him was
later dismissed. Miller was convicted and the affirmance of his conviction ap-
pears in Miller v. United States, 24 F-2d 353 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 276
U.S. 638 (1928).
4 People v. Connolly, 253 N.Y. 330, 171 N.. 393 (1930), affirming, 227
App. Div. 167, 237 N.Y. Supp. 303 (2d Dep't 1929).
5 Cf. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Smith v. United
States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954).
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Miss Wendel died in 1931, leaving a fortune of about
$40,000,000 and a will bequeathing it mainly to charities.
There were no close relatives, but several thousand dis-
tant or purported close relatives flocked in to contest
probate.' Buckner was engaged as trial counsel for the
proponent of the will, but when he became ill, Harlan
took charge of the case. Several who alleged that they
were the nearest relatives were unmasked as impostors,
their claims being based in part on forged documents. This
involved careful detective work by Harlan and his staff and
difficult and extended trials.7 The most notorious claim-
ant went to jail for the fraud which was thus uncovered.'
The will ultimately was probated after a settlement with
the nearest bona fide relatives.
Upon Mr. Buckner's untimely disability and death, Har-
lan became the leading trial lawyer of Root, Clark, Buck-
ner & Ballantine. In the years preceding the war he was
in charge of many law suits, only three of which will be
mentioned here. He represented the New York City
Board of Higher Education in the litigation challenging
Bertrand Russell's appointment to teach in the College
of the City of New York.9 In Randall v. Bailey," he unsuc-
cessfully argued that corporate directors should not be
permitted to declare dividends out of surplus created by
revaluing fixed assets upwards, the appreciation being as
6 In re Wendel's Will, 143 Misc. 480,257 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1932).
7 In re Wende's Estate, 146 Misc. 260, 262 N.Y. Supp. 41 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
In re Wendel's Estate, 148 Misc. 884, 267 N.Y. Supp. 33 (Surf. Ct. 1933); In re
Wendel's Estate, 159 Misc. 443, 287 N.Y. Supp. 893 (Surf. Ct. 1936).
8 See People v. Morris, 151 Misc. 212, 270 N.Y. Supp. 901 (Ct Gen. Sess.
1934).
9 Kay v. Bd. of Higher Education, N.Y. City, 260 App. Div. 9, 20 N.Y.S.2d
898 (1st De 't 1940), leave to appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 849, 23 N.Y.S.2d
479 (1st Dep't 1940). See also Kay v. Bd. of Higher Education, N.Y. City, 173
Misc. 943, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd without opinion, 259 App. Div.
879, 20 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dep't 1940), leave to appeal denied, 259 App. Div.
1000, 21 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep't 1940), 284 N.Y. 578, 29 N.E.2d 657 (1940).
10 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942).
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yet unrealized." He also represented American Optical
Company in a prolonged anti-trust trial. (The case was
suspended during the war and finally settled.)
During World War H, Harlan was a Colonel with the
Eighth Air Force in England, and was in charge of its
Operations Analysis Section. This comprised a group of
engineers, physicists, mathematicians and others with
technical training (with a sprinkling of very capable at-
torneys), about one hundred men at a maximum. The
Section had no operational duties or responsibilities. It
was free on a roving basis to investigate and give detached
study to any aspect of operations and to devote its special-
ized skills to their improvement. In particular, trouble-
some problems which might arise from time to time would
be referred to it, such as to discover why in some circum-
stances bombing accuracy was less than expected, or to
determine what were the optimum forces to attack certain
types of objectives.
Colonel Harlan organized and supervised this Section,
which pioneered the idea in the Air Force. The group
was very effective, and its success led to the formation of
similar organizations by other components of the Ameri-
can Air Force. Colonel Harlan was decorated with the
Legion of Merit, and with the French and Belgian Croix
de Guerre.
Mr. Harlan's first case upon his return to civilian life in
1945 was also his first opportunity to argue before the
]a Harlan's view as to the correct rule of law in the Randall v. Bailey
situation did not change upon his becoming a judge. In Commissioner v.
Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523, 527 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861
(1954), he said: "... The 'capital impairment' statutes of some states permit
unrealized appreciation to be calculated in determining corporate surplus
available for dividends. E.g., § 58, N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, McKinney's
Consol. Laws, c. 59; Randall v. Bailey, 1942, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 NE.2d 43. Other
states, perhaps more in keeping with sound accounting and business practice,
do not permit unrealized appreciation to be counted in computing corporate
surplus, in determining which the corporate assets are to be reckoned at their
historical cost. E.g., Ill. Rev. Stats. 1951, c. 32, § 41(c), S.H.A. Ill. ch. 32, § 157.
41(c); Penn. Stats., Tit. 15, §§ 2852-701, subd. A (1), 702 (Purdon 1936)."
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United States Supreme Court. The United States had
filed an anti-trust suit against foreign diamond mining
companies, and promptly obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion tying up all of the property of the defendants in this
country. The injunction was thought to be justified as
insuring the appearance of the defendants at the trial. The
defendants could not appeal from the injunction, since
the anti-trust laws allowed appeals only from final judg-
ments. The Supreme Court, however, by a 5-4 vote,
agreed with Harlan's argument that it had jurisdiction to
review the case by issuing an extraordinary writ of cert-
iorari. On the merits, the injunction was reversed as be-
yond the power of the District Court. 2
Harlan also was successful in his argument of the Bene-
ficial case before the Supreme Court.' This has become
the leading case in the federal courts on the appealability
of intermediate orders which display some elements of
finality, and also a leading case in the field of derivative
stockholder suits. The Court upheld the constitutionality
of a state statute making unsuccessful plaintiffs in stock-
holder's suits liable for the reasonable expenses and at-
torneys' fees of the defendants and entitling the corpora-
tion, at any stage of the suit, to require security for their
payment. The Court went on to hold, by a 6-3 vote, that
this statute should be applied in the federal courts in
diversity of citizenship cases.
The greatest portion of Harlan's time in this post-war
period was spent in two anti-trust cases against E. I. du
Pont de Nemours and Company. Both cases involved pro-
tracted periods of preparation and long and arduous trials.
The first involved what was found by the District Judge
12 De Beers Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945). The jurisdictional
question was discussed at greater length in U.S. Alkali Ass'n v. United States,
325 U.S. 196 (1945).
13 Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), afilrming sub nom.,
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948).
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to be an international cartel, covering substantially the
entire chemical field.' In the second, the United States
charged a gigantic conspiracy, among du Pont, members
of the du Pont family and two holding companies, to con-
trol du Pont, General Motors and United States Rubber
Company. The purpose of this alleged conspiracy was to
require each company to purchase from the others, and
to avoid competing with the others. This case in particular
raised important issues, not only to the companies involved
but to the country generally. The District Court has com-
pletely rejected these charges,'5 and the case has been
appealed to the Supreme Court, apparently on a somewhat
different theory.
It is of course impossible within reasonable compass to
review each of the innumerable cases in which Mr. Har-
lan has participated in his busy career; the above are a
few of the highlights. His practice was naturally weighted
in the direction of the corporate and commercial litigation
most prevalent in downtown New York law firms, but it
was not so limited. Harlan is, for instance, unusually ex-
perienced in criminal litigation, not only as a prosecutor
but also in some cases as attorney for the defendant. Also
uncommon in such a practice is the fact that in the stock-
holder type of litigation, he has on occasion represented
plaintiffs as well as defendants.' 6 His broad experience in
practice will undoubtedly be of great value in his further
judicial work.
As an advocate, and particularly as an appellate advo-
cate, Harlan was superb. Certain Justices of the Supreme
Court expressed the opinion that Harlan's arguments be-
14 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (SD.
N.Y. 1951); on decree, 105 F. Supp. 215 (SD.N.Y. 1952).
15 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, 126 F. Supp.
235 (ND. M11. 1954).
16 Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312 (SD.N.Y. 1948), cert. denied
sub nom., Income Bondholders v. New York Central R.R., 336 U.S. 919
(1949); Wood v. New York Central R.R., 286 I.C.C. 373 (1952).
19553
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
fore them were among the best they had heard. His princ-
ipal asset was his ability to make sense to the Court, no
matter how complex the issue. He argued simply and
interestingly, and got across his ideas and arguments
with the utmost lucidity. Back of this, of course, was hard
work. Even as a senior partner in Root, Ballantine, Har-
lan, Bushby & Palmer (as his firm was called when he
left it), he worked as long and as hard as even the most
junior associate. But it also involved the ability to analyze
the problems involved in his cases, particularly in devel-
oping theories of the facts and law to advance his cause.
He was especially skillful in organizing and supervising
the work of his staff, both legal and non-legal. In view
of the importance of his cases, his staff was frequently
quite large, and its efficient direction required legal and
practical ability of the highest order.
In a sense, Harlan's judicial career is an extension of
his life-long devotion, in the best tradition of the Bar, to
public service. We have already seen his work in the
United States Attorney's office and in the Connolly inves-
tigation, and his wartime service. He was also counsel to
the New York Crime Commission from 1951 to 1953. This
investigation uncovered several unsavory instances of lo-
cal corruption in New York State. It also looked into
racketeering and crime on the waterfront in and around
New York City, leading to the establishment of the Wa-
terfront Commission of New York Harbor.'7 Harlan was
always active in bar associations, serving for several years
as Chairman of the Committee on Professional Ethics of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and
later as Chairman of its Committee on the Judiciary and
as Vice President of the Association. He was a director of
the Legal Aid Society.
17 Laws of New York, 1953, Chs. 882, 883; Laws of New Jersey, 1953, Chs.
202, 203; Public Law 252, Ch. 407, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 STAT. 541.
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In January 1954, the President nominated Harlan for
the post of United States Circuit Judge for the Second
Circuit. Judge Harlan took his seat on March 6, 1954,
and accordingly served for approximately one year on
the Court of Appeals. This is of course insufficient to per-
mit of more than a tentative appraisal of his judicial
career.
At the arguments before the Court of Appeals, Judge
Harlan was rather free with his questioning of attorneys
(perhaps, a reflection of his own statements, while practic-
ing, that he preferred to argue before judges who asked
questions). However, he was careful not to take the argu-
ment away from counsel, and his questions were usually
very pertinent. They frequently indicated that the Judge
had prepared himself to some extent before the argument,
an aid which counsel do not usually experience.
Up to the end of February, 1955, Judge Harlan had sat
in 85 decided cases. Of these, 26 were disposed of in per
curiam opinions. In the other 59 cases Judge Harlan
wrote the opinion of the Court in 23; he dissented only
twice. Oddly enough, each dissent was in a case requiring
the interpretation of the Supreme Court's mandate on a
prior appeal.'
Judge Harlan's opinions are written clearly and care-
fully. They indicate that a great deal of work, including
original research, went into them. 9 A substantial num-
ber required the interpretation of statutes. Here Judge
Harlan conscientiously sought to construe these laws in
accordance with their broad purpose,- rather than me-
8 United States v. Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 902 (1954); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 962 (1955).
19 See, for instance, Dixon v. United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir.
1955), involving the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness, and also two
conflict of law cases, Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co.,.. . F.2d ... (2d Cir.
Feb. 10, 1955), and Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., ...... 2d... (2d Cir.
Feb. 17, 1955).
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chanically.2 ° His tax opinions, for instance, are practical
rather than literal interpretations of the Code.2 In a
bankruptcy case, he expressed the belief that state record-
ation statutes should not be construed "needlessly to de-
stroy conditional sales contracts." 22 He also attempted to
apply procedural rules with common sense.23
Most public attention has been given to his opinion af-
firming the conviction under the Smith Act of the so-
called second string Communists." A number of others
are mentioned in the footnote.2 5
* * *
Justice Harlan has the ability, the experience and the
personality to become a valuable member of the Supreme
Court. His lifetime of active practice is one asset in which'
the present Court is not particularly strong, since many
20 See particularly Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954),
interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act, and United States v. Wiesner, 216
F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1954), involving the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code.
21 Newton v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1954); Niles-Bement-Pond
Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 213 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust,
213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861 (1954); Lupia's Estate
v. Marcelle, 214 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1954), affd, 348 U.S. 956 (1955);
Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 348
U.S. 895 (1954); Commissioner v. Watson's Estate, 216 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1954).
22 Cummings-Landau Laundry Machinery Co. v. Alderman, 212 F.2d
342, 346 (2d Cir. 1954).
23 Hyam v. American Export Lines, 213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1954); O'Donnell
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 215 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1954); Murarka v.
Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954); Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d
571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955); Perkins v. United
Transp. Co., 219 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1955); see also United States v. H.
Wool & Sons, 215 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954).
24 United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 909 (1955).
25 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Internat'l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 215 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1954) (refusing to stay CAB regulations as to hours of service);
Austrian v.Williams, 216 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.deniedsub nom., Fogarty
v. Austrian, 348 U.S. 953 (1955) (holding exclusive jurisdiction to award certain
fees and expenses to be in bankruptcy court); United States ex rel. Leong Choy
Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954) (refusing to set aside an order
for deportation of an alien to Communist China, but giving the alien a further
opportunity to choose deportation to Formosa); Perma-Fit Shoulder Pad Co.
v. Best Made Shoulder Pad Corp., 218 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding
patent invalid and not infringed).
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of the Justices came to the Court from political or aca-
demic life. His habits of hard work and clear thinking
should also serve him in good stead. As the President
said, "Judge Harlan's qualifications for [the post of Jus-
tice] are of the highest. Certainly, they were the highest
of any that I could find."26
Edward L. Friedman, Jr.*
26 N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1955, p. 12, col. 5.
* Practicing Attorney, Legal Department, New York Telephone Company.
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